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INTRODUCTION
In YG v S 2018 (1) SACR 64 (GJ), the Gauteng Local Division, Johannes-
burg, declared the common-law defence of ‘reasonable corporal punish-
ment’ (‘the defence’), previously available to parents charged with assault of
their children, unconstitutional. By doing so, South Africa becomes the
fifty-fourth state legally to prohibit corporal punishment of children adminis-
tered by parents in addition to that inflicted by teachers. In this note I draw
attention to a justificatory shortfall in the judgment. I argue that while the
court was right to declare the defence incompatible with the Constitution of
the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (‘the Constitution’), and although it
provides good reasons for doing so, it fails to furnish sufficiently compelling
arguments to show that the reasons it supplies are good reasons.
THE FACTS AND THE JUDGMENT
Dismissing an appeal from a conviction for assault, Keightley J (Francis J
concurring) upheld the trial court’s ruling that a father’s (the appellant’s)
bruising physical chastisement of his son, M, for having watched internet
pornography, kicking and punching the latter over a period of more than half
an hour, exceeded the limits of corporal punishment allowable by the
defence and amounted to an assault. (The court affirmed, in addition, the trial
court’s rejection of the appellant’s plea that in subsequently inflicting physical
force on the body of his wife, an event triggered by his suspicion that she was
having an affair, he had acted in self-defence, but since I am concerned here
exclusively with the court’s finding in relation to the constitutional status of
the defence, I shall set aside this aspect of the judgment in the discussion that
follows.) The court’s determination that the appellant’s exercise of physical
force against M exceeded the limits of severity permissible under the defence
effectively rendered the question of the defence’s consistency with the
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Constitution moot. The court nevertheless proceeded to consider the
constitutional status of the defence, justifying its pronouncing on this issue as
being for three reasons necessitated by the interests of justice: (a) the
important interests of the state in knowing whether or not the defence is
constitutional, and of parents in knowing whether or not mild or moderate
corporal punishment of children is lawful; (b) the duty of courts to develop
the common law so as to bring it into conformity with the Constitution; and
(c) the reality that the court’s holding back from deciding the constitutional
issue ‘would mean that children’s rights would continue to be placed in
potential jeopardy unless and until the Legislature took action’ (para 28), a
prospect which appeared to the court remote in the absence of any indication
from the Minister of Social Development (‘the Minister’), in her submission
to the court, as to when the necessary legislation might be drafted. A further
consideration motivating the court to decide the constitutional question was
that the Minister was not opposed to its doing so (para 29). The Minister’s
contentment with the court’s determining the constitutional validity of the
defence, together with her support for a declaration of the defence’s
unconstitutionality, to an appreciable degree defused an objection to the
effect that the court’s decision amounts to an illegitimate encroachment onto
the legislature’s policy-making domain.
Having established the existence and nature of the defence under the
common law (paras 31–5), the court commenced its assessment of the
defence’s consistency with the Constitution by enumerating the rights
engaged by this enquiry: the rights of everyone to human dignity, to equal
protection under the law, to be free from ‘all forms of violence from either
public or private sources’ and to be protected against ‘cruel, inhuman or
degrading’ treatment or punishment (ss 10, 9 and 12 of the Constitution
respectively), as well as the right of children in particular to protection against
‘maltreatment, neglect, abuse or degradation’ (s 28). Keightley J referred as
well to the principle that ‘a child’s best interests are of paramount importance
in every matter concerning the child’ (para 36). Also invoked by the amicus
curiae Freedom of Religion South Africa (‘FORSA’) in support of the
defence, the court noted, are parents’ right to freedom of religion, belief and
opinion, their right to human dignity and the rights of cultural and religious
communities (ss 15, 10 and 31), as well as the Constitutional Court’s avowal
of the ‘importance of the family unit’ in Dawood & another v Minister of Home
Affairs & others; Shalabi & another v Minister of Home Affairs & others; Thomas &
another v Minister of Home Affairs & others 2000 (3) SA 936 (CC) para 31.
The court proceeded to array South African precedent bearing on
corporal punishment, including S v Williams 1995 (3) SA 332 (CC), in which
the CC declared corporal punishment of juvenile offenders to be in violation
of their rights to dignity and to protection against cruel, inhuman and
degrading treatment, acknowledging the potential of corporal punishment to
erode children’s ‘regard for a culture of decency and respect for the rights of
others’ (para 40). The court also took note of the Constitutional Court’s
rejection of a claim for a religious exemption from the statutory prohibition
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on corporal punishment by teachers in Christian Education South Africa v
Minister of Education 2000 (4) SA 757 (CC) on the basis of its duty to protect
children from ‘degradation and indignity inherent in corporal punishment in
schools’ (para 43). Also referred to by the court was S v M (Centre for Child
Law as Amicus Curiae) 2008 (3) SA 232 (CC), in which the Constitutional
Court observed that taking children’s rights seriously requires ‘a critical shift
in the relationship between parents, children and the protection of the law’
and that children have ‘the right as far as possible to live in a secure and
nurturing environment free from violence, fear, want and avoidable trauma’
(para 46). The court mentioned legislation giving effect to children’s
constitutional rights: principally the Children’s Act 38 of 2005, but also the
Domestic Violence Act 116 of 1998, which includes children as potential
complainants (paras 48–50). Finally, Keightley J alluded to the state’s
international obligations under the United Nations Convention on the
Rights of the Child (‘CRC’), ratified by South Africa, which encompass the
duty to ‘take all legislative, administrative, social and educational measures to
protect the child from all forms of physical or mental violence, injury or
abuse ... or maltreatment while in the care of parents’, and to ensure that
children will not be subject to ‘torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading
treatment or punishment’ (para 53). Acknowledging that the CRC does not
explicitly oblige states legally to proscribe corporal punishment, the court
referred to two comments by the United Nations Committee on the Rights
of the Child (the committee set up to enforce and monitor states’ compliance
with the CRC) to the effect that all corporal punishment, as a type of
violence and a form of degrading treatment, and an act, moreover, that
violates children’s right to physical and psychological integrity, contravenes
the CRC (paras 54–5).
The court considered the bearing of statute, precedent and international
law on the constitutionality of the defence. Keightley J rejected FORSA’s
contention that the entitlement of parents to inflict corporal punishment is an
aspect of the liberty and authority vested in them to raise their children as
they see fit, provided that they do so in a way that promotes (or at least does
not set back) the basic interests of children; and that corporal punishment
permitted by the defence should not be deemed ‘violence’ or ‘physical abuse’
because it is restricted to ‘reasonable’ exercises of physical force, and because
it conduces to the overall wellbeing of children by instilling discipline in
them (paras 65–6). The court countered these arguments by giving reasons to
consider even ‘mild’ or ‘moderate’ corporal punishment unconstitutional.
First, the physical and psychological robustness of children varies from one
child to the next, as does their susceptibility to the potential harms of corporal
punishment, so that a highly sensitive child may suffer physical harms not
experienced by a more resilient child who receives the same amount of
corporal punishment (para 67). The second reason has to do with what
Keightley J calls ‘arbitrariness’: because the defence defines legally permissi-
ble physical chastisement vaguely as that which is ‘reasonable’ or ‘moderate’,
parents who wish to inflict it safely — that is, in a way that does no physical
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injury or psychological harm to their children — are left with no determinate
guidance about how much force they can administer without causing
physical injury or psychological harm; and as a result of this vagueness, even
benevolently motivated parents may inadvertently inflict corporal punish-
ment of a severity that may be physically injurious or psychologically harmful
(para 68). Thirdly, since corporal punishment ‘inevitably involves a measure
of violence’ and ‘undoubtedly also breaches the physical integrity of the
child’, it violates the rights of children to bodily integrity and to be protected
from violence contained in s 12 of the Bill of Rights (para 70). Fourthly,
since the violation of a child’s right to physical integrity ‘must inevitably
involve a measure of degradation or loss of dignity for the child’, and because
the law fails to provide the same level of protection for children as for adults
in relation to what the law criminalises as assault, children are ‘effectively
treated as second-class citizens’ (para 72), corporal punishment is inherently
degrading. Fifthly, this unequal treatment of children relative to adults, in
addition to degrading them, amounts to a violation of children’s right to
equality, protected under s 9 of the Constitution, since it must be accounted
age-based discrimination; and this discrimination cannot be shown to be fair
given that corporal punishment does not benefit children overall but instead
adversely affects their interests in not being subjected to violence, in the
protection of their bodily integrity, and in not being degraded (para 76).
The court concluded its assessment of the constitutionality of the defence
by asking whether the infringements of children’s rights to which it has
referred might be justifiable under s 36 of the Constitution; whether, that is,
the infringements of these rights might be outweighed by the interests of
parents in continuing to administer corporal punishment and the interests of
children in continuing to receive it. The court emphasised that its indictment
of corporal punishment does not amount to a condemnation of child
discipline, which parents will still, in the absence of the defence, be lawfully
permitted to carry out — provided they refrain from using physical
punishment (para 80). To the concern that doing away with the defence will
result in the criminalisation of well-meaning and otherwise law-abiding
parents who continue to administer mild corporal punishment and who will
as a result be vulnerable to prosecution and conviction for assault, with the
consequence that they ‘may end up losing their children’, the court
responded that this is not the aim of criminalising corporal punishment,
which is to protect children’s rights (para 81). Keightley J firmly rejected
FORSA’s contention that criminalisation will violate the right to religious
freedom of parents who perceive themselves to be under a religious duty to
administer corporal punishment: ‘children’s rights are not subordinated to
the religious views of their parents ... . It is so that [religious parents] may
have to consider changing their mode of discipline, but in view of the
importance of the principle of the best interests of the child, this is a justifiable
limitation on the rights of parents’ (para 84).
A JUSTIFICATORY DEFICIT
The court is right to criminalise forms of mild and moderate corporal
punishment previously permitted by the defence, and the reasons it provides
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in support of its decision are sound. Even mild and infrequently administered
corporal punishment administered by loving parents, I argue in a recent
monograph on corporal punishment, is seriously morally wrongful on the
grounds that it violates children’s rights to bodily security (including the right
not to be subjected to violence subsumed under it), the right not to be
punished degradingly, and the right not to be unfairly discriminated against.
Furthermore, it exposes children, whose physical robustness and psychologi-
cal resilience may vary, to the risk of psychological harm, and is susceptible to
escalation into physically injurious force (Patrick Lenta Corporal Punishment:
A Philosophical Analysis (2018) chs 2–4). And since the state is obliged to do
what is necessary to protect children’s basic interests, corporal punishment
ought to be criminalised (Lenta op cit ch 5). But while I find the outcome in
this case appealing, my satisfaction with the judgment is mixed with
disappointment at a degree of shallowness and thinness of the argument that
court presented in justification of its decision.
The court’s application of the engaged rights
Only ten of the judgment’s 107 paragraphs — paras 67 to 76 — are given
over to providing reasons for the court’s assessment that mild corporal
punishment and the defence which permits parents to administer it violate
children’s rights, with only another five paragraphs — paras 79 to 84 —
devoted to replying to objections raised against the criminalisation of all
corporal punishment. Reason-giving concerning these issues is marginalised
in favour of an introduction of the various amici, a consideration of whether
the high court is authorised to pronounce on constitutionality of the defence,
a recitation of the implicated rights, and a protracted discussion of statute,
international law and precedent — which together runs to 47 paragraphs
(paras 13–60). The reasons for the marginalisation of substantive reasoning
and argumentation are not hard to fathom. Although in this case judicial
anxiety about encroaching on the policy domain of Parliament (sometimes
generated by concerns about the fragile legitimacy of rights-based judicial
review given its counter-majoritarian character) was to some extent allevi-
ated by the support expressed by the Minister for scrapping the defence, the
court cannot have been unaware that the view of the majority of South
Africans is that mild to moderate corporal punishment administered by
parents is morally acceptable and should be legally permitted. Given the
court’s likely anxiety about two judges imposing on everyone else their
unpopular interpretation of the rights in question, albeit an interpretation
endorsed by the Minister, it is understandable that the court should
concentrate its reason-giving on facts which purport to show that it is legally
authorised — by the Constitution, statute, precedent and international law —
both to decide the constitutional question and to strike down the defence as
unconstitutional. But the cost of this focus on textual sources of legal
authority and their phraseology, and the concomitant confinement to
cramped quarters of reason-giving in relation to the court’s application of the
implicated rights, is a reduction in the quality of justification.
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Ajudgment settling a constitutional issue is supposed to justify the decision
arrived at — in this case criminalisation of even the mildest forms of corporal
punishment — by providing persuasive reasons for its acceptance by the
ordinary men and women such a change in the law will affect. But to
persuade reasonable people, a court must not only specify the reasons for its
decision — that the defence possesses a degree of arbitrariness or vagueness;
that corporal punishment amounts to violence; that this disciplinary tech-
nique violates children’s rights to bodily integrity, to be protected against
degrading punishment and to be free from unfair discrimination; that the
freedom of religious believers must give way when it conflicts with the
fundamental rights of children; and that criminalisation of corporal punish-
ment need not result in the criminalisation of loving, benevolently motivated
parents — but also show, through argumentation that supports these reasons
and provides a satisfactory response to challenges to them, that these reasons are
good reasons. It is at this level of justification that the judgment is deficient.
Here is an example. One of the reasons the court provided in support of its
decision is that corporal punishment is inherently violent. What arguments
does it provide in support of this proposition? None. In place of an argument
we are told that it is ‘obvious’ (para 70). But it is far from obvious that mild
corporal punishment is violent, and some thoughtful social scientists and
legal commentators have denied it (see, for example, Mui Kim Teh
‘Corporal punishment — Archaic or reasonable discipline method’ (2012) 17
International Journal of Law and Education 73 at 82; Diana Baumrind ‘Necessary
distinctions’ (1997) 8 Psychological Inquiry 176 at 177). Indeed, I imagine that
most South African parents who have hitherto spanked their children from
time to time, as the vast majority of South African parents have, will be
surprised to hear that they have been perpetrating acts of violence against
their children. The court thus needs to provide an argument in support of
considering corporal punishment as violent; mere assertion does not suffice.
One way to commence this task would be to provide — or if necessary,
propound — a definition of violence, or at least of physical violence, that fits
with a preponderance of our intuitive judgements, and then to show that
even relatively mild corporal punishment counts as violence under it. A
convenient place to start is with the definition of violence provided by an
authoritative dictionary such as the Oxford English Dictionary, which defines
violence (sense 1.a) as ‘the deliberate exercise of physical force against a
person or property’. Corporal punishment, as an exercise of physical force
against a person, amounts to violence under this definition. But simply
wheeling out this definition will not suffice to show that mild corporal
punishment amounts to violence, since violence is sometimes defined in such
a way that only exercises of severe force count as violence. Those who
subscribe to this definition of violence may insist that physical force inflicted
in the course of mild or moderate corporal punishment is not severe enough
to count as violence. So an argument is required to make the point that even
moderate, physically non-injurious spanking or slapping is violent. One way
to make this point is to insist that few would hesitate to label a husband’s
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slapping his wife with the aim of disciplining her as domestic violence even if
the physical force he employs is moderate and insufficiently severe to cause
physical injury. And if the slaps administered by the husband amount to
violence, then by the same token ‘reasonable’ corporal punishment must
count as violence — violence in any case admitting of different degrees of
severity.
Still more argument is required to show that all corporal punishment
amounts to a violation, as opposed to merely an infringement, of children’s
right not to be subjected to violence. Suppose a parent, who happens to be a
doctor, slaps his child’s face, correctly deeming it necessary to prevent the
latter from slipping into an irreversible coma. We would not condemn the
parent’s action as a violation of the rights of the child, though it is plausibly
considered violent. That is because the parent’s action can be justified
paternalistically as being benignly oriented towards promoting the child’s
wellbeing on balance and furthering her interests. But many supporters of
corporal punishment defend it on the same basis — that it is ‘for the child’s
own good’. If we want to show why all corporal punishment violates the
rights of children to protection against violence, we need an argument to
show why the paternalist justification of corporal punishment is unsound.
The court failed to provide one.
Another example of the justificatory shortfall in the court’s judgment
relates to the court’s second reason for holding that the defence is unconstitu-
tional: it ‘undoubtedly also breaches the physical integrity of the child’
(para 70) and, as such, constitutes a violation of the right to bodily integrity
reflected in s 12 of the Constitution. The court stated in support of this claim
that ‘the offence of assault under the common law is aimed at protecting
bodily integrity’, and that corporal punishment would, in the absence of the
defence, be a form of assault. But this is too quick. For one thing, it is not
clear that corporal punishment need even infringe the right to bodily integrity.
‘Integrity’ usually refers to wholeness or intactness, and corporal punishment
in the form of two swift smacks on a child’s behind need not intrude into the
body or undermine its intactness (David Benatar ‘The child, the rod and the
law’ 1996 Acta Juridica 197-214 at 205). But even if we set this point aside,
there are ways in which parents might infringe their children’s right to bodily
integrity without violating it. A parent might subject a child to an injection,
such as a vaccination, against the child’s will, having received authoritative
medical advice that the vaccination is necessary to safeguard the child from
contracting a serious disease. The child’s right to bodily integrity will have
been infringed in this case, but it will not have been violated, the child having
benefited significantly on balance in consequence of having received the
injection. Someone — perhaps Keightley J — might respond that the cases of
corporal punishment and forcibly subjecting a child to a health-protecting
vaccination are disanalogous inasmuch as the latter enhances the child’s
wellbeing overall whereas the former diminishes it. But if that is the
argument, then once again we need to know why even mild corporal
punishment sets back children’s interests, particularly given that many people
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consider it to be ‘for the child’s own good’ in virtue of its efficacy in driving
home moral lessons and eliciting from persistently refractory children
obedience to commands paternalistically oriented towards their safety and
protection (‘Don’t put your finger in the electricity socket!’, ‘Eat your
vegetables!’ and so forth), while others take the view that even if it has no
great benefits the occasional spanking can do no harm.
A possible reason for considering even mild corporal punishment to be bad
for children is one mentioned by the court: ‘it must inevitably involve a
measure of degradation or loss of dignity for the child’ (para 72). But why
think that very mild corporal punishment — the occasional smack —
unacceptably degrades children? Keightley J submits that all corporal punish-
ment violates children’s right not to be degraded because ‘where conduct
breaches a child’s right to physical integrity’ it must have this consequence.
But for reasons adumbrated above, she fails to show that all corporal
punishment violates children’s right to bodily integrity or even their
entitlement to bodily security (although the latter right is clearly infringed).
Further, many deny that mild corporal punishment, administered occasion-
ally, is inherently degrading (see, for instance, Robert Gregory ‘Is corporal
punishment degrading?’ (1891) 153 The North American Review 693 at 696;
David Benatar ‘Corporal punishment’ (1998) 24 Social Theory and Practice
237). By no means all children feel degraded by it. And as one defender of
mild and infrequent corporal punishment has argued, if we do not consider
the subjection of criminals to prison conditions that are arguably more
degrading than mild corporal punishment to violate their right against
degrading punishment, it is far from obvious that we should consider mild
corporal punishment of children to violate this right (Benatar op cit at
241–2). What is necessary to show that corporal punishment is inherently
degrading are arguments drawing on one or more accounts of degrading
punishment which demonstrate that even mild corporal punishment
degrades children. Such arguments do not feature in the judgment.
Keightley J also said, in favour of considering children to be unacceptably
degraded by corporal punishment, that since it is legally permissible under
the defence for parents to carry it out, whereas the law criminalises as assault
exercises of physical force of equal severity on the bodies of adults, it follows
that the state effectively treats children ‘as second-class citizens’ compared to
adults by providing their rights with a lower level of protection relative to
adults’ rights (para 72). (In Keightley J’s view, this also amounts to a violation
of the rights, reflected in s 9 of the Constitution, to equal protection under
the law and not to be unfairly discriminated against on the ground of age
(paras 75–6).) But why think that this legal discrimination against children on
the ground of their age unacceptably degrades them? After all, the law treats
(younger) children differently from adults in many ways that it would be
implausible to view as objectionably degrading. It prohibits them from
engaging in sexual intercourse, from getting married and from carrying out
many kinds of work, for example, as well as requiring that they be educated.
It is implausible to think that such discriminatory treatment of children
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unacceptably degrades them or that it is unfair (and so violates their right to
equal treatment). Why? Because these instances of differential treatment
safeguard the basic interests and rights of children, something the state has an
obligation, as parens patriae, to do. Someone might at this point urge that the
defence, by contrast with these forms of differential treatment, adversely
affects the interests of children by allowing their parents to hit them. But this
needs to be demonstrated, since many disagree, arguing that the age
discrimination involved in legally permitting moderate corporal punishment
can be justified paternalistically with reference to the benefits accruing to
children through the administration of what they deem an effective, and in
the view of some, indispensable, disciplinary technique.
The dearth of argumentation in support of the reasons provided by the
court could to some extent have been compensated for had it considered and
explained its disagreement with some important foreign constitutional
jurisprudence relating to corporal punishment meted out by parents — had it
explained, for example, why the Chief Justice of the Canadian Supreme
Court was wrong to conclude, in her majority judgment in Canadian
Foundation for Children, Youth and the Law v Canada (Attorney General) [2004]
1 SCR 76 that s 43 of the Canadian Criminal Code is constitutionally valid in
that it does not fail to respect the child’s dignity, is not unfairly demeaning,
does not discriminate unfairly and is, on the contrary, ‘firmly grounded in the
actual needs and circumstances of children’ (ibid para 68: s 43 of the
Canadian Criminal Code permits parents to inflict corporal punishment ‘if
the force does not exceed what is reasonable in the circumstances’). Or,
moreover, why the European Court of Human Rights was wrong to hold in
Costello-Roberts v The United Kingdom (1993) EHRR 112 that corporal
punishment can only be considered a violation of a child’s right not to
undergo degrading punishment if it reaches a certain pitch of severity?
(Admittedly, Costello-Roberts concerned corporal punishment administered
by a teacher, but its holding was subsequently affirmed in A v United Kingdom
[1998] 2 FLR 959 (ECHR), which dealt with corporal punishment carried
out by a parent.) Despite Keightley J’s judgment exhibiting signs of
familiarity with at least one of these decisions — it is unlikely to be
coincidental that the phrase ‘second-class citizens’, which she uses to describe
children’s status as a result their being deprived of the protection of the
criminal law against intentional exercises of physical force on their bodies,
also appears in the dissenting judgments of Justices Binnie and Deschamps in
Canadian Foundation (supra) paras 72, 109 and 231 — she neither engages
with, nor cites, foreign case law.
In failing to provide a fuller, deeper justification of its declaration that the
defence is unconstitutional, the court not only failed fully to discharge its
duty under basic principles of liberal democracy credibly to justify exercises
of state power — of which the judiciary’s criminalisation of all corporal
punishment, an abridgement of the liberty of all parents, is an example — but
also squanders an opportunity for pedagogy and persuasion. For if the court is
right that all physical chastisement of children violates their fundamental
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rights, it is highly desirable that the incidence of corporal punishment should
as far as possible be reduced. Yet it is improbable that the criminalisation of
corporal punishment will bring about a significant reduction in the incidence
of corporal punishment through deterrence, since parents who want to inflict
corporal punishment will know that they do not have much to fear by way of
prosecution and punishment, seeing that the stated policy of the Minister,
endorsed by the court in para 81, appears to be one of prosecutorial restraint.
More likely to contribute meaningfully to a lowering of the incidence of
corporal punishment is criminalisation’s affecting an alteration in people’s
attitudes, so that they come to see the act as morally wrongful; and the best
way to initiate a change in people’s beliefs concerning the moral acceptability
of this practice is to persuade those who need persuading that even moderate
spanking is seriously wrong by virtue, in part, of its violating children’s rights.
Supplying compelling arguments to show that corporal punishment neces-
sarily violates several fundamental rights of children goes a considerable way
towards achieving that end.
The effects of corporal punishment and the consequences of the defence
To establish that all corporal punishment violates children’s rights, it would
help to show that it does not significantly enhance children’s wellbeing
overall, and that it in fact sets back children’s interests. For the court to have
shown this would have required it to engage with the relevant empirical data
bearing on the effects of corporal punishment on children. The court’s
reluctance to consider this evidence is to some extent understandable; judges
often feel out of their depth in the empirical social sciences. Nevertheless, it is
difficult to provide a convincing explanation of why even mild corporal
punishment is bad for children without mentioning the results of empirical
studies relating to its effects — studies whose findings exhibit, in certain
respects, a high degree of convergence.
The court mentioned in passing that the defence permits parents to violate
children’s right to ‘psychological integrity’ under s 12(2) of the Constitution
(para 70), but provides no argument in support of this averment. Keightley J
could, however, have referred to a recent overview of the empirical data
showing that even parental spanking, as distinguished from more severe
exercises of force on the bodies of children, is associated with seriously
adverse psychological outcomes for children:
‘In childhood, parental use of spanking was associated with low moral
internalization, aggression, antisocial behaviour, externalizing behaviour prob-
lems, internalizing behaviour problems, mental health problems, negative
parent-child relationships, impaired cognitive ability, low self-esteem, and risk
of physical abuse from parents. In adulthood, prior experiences of parental use
of spanking were significantly associated with adult antisocial behaviour, adult
mental health problems, and with positive attitudes about spanking.’ (Elizabeth
T Gershoff & Andrew Grogan-Kaylor ‘Spanking and child outcomes: Old
controversies and new meta-analyses’ (2016) 30 Journal of Family Psychology 453
at 457.)
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The evidence relating to parental spanking’s effects indicates not that every
child subjected to it will be psychologically harmed and manifest these types
of undesirable behaviour (so that the common response to such evidence that
‘I was corporally punished and turned out fine’ is beside the point), but that
resort to corporal punishment, even when restricted to milder forms such as
spanking a child’s bottom with the flat of the hand, increases the probability of
negative outcomes. At the same time, there are no studies indicating that
parental spanking promotes healthy child development or is conducive to
mental health or wellbeing. The evidence we have about the risk of
psychological harm even mild corporal punishment poses lends support to
the claim that corporal punishment poses an unnecessary risk to children’s
psychological integrity. (This evidence suggests that even ‘reasonable’ paren-
tal spanking would count as abuse under the Children’s Act 38 of 2005,
which defines ‘abuse’ to include ‘exposing or subjecting a child to behaviour
that may harm the child psychologically or physically’.) And when we add to
this the anxiety not uncommonly occasioned by children’s anticipation of
corporal punishment and the fear elicited during it, we have strong grounds
for concluding that it violates children’s psychological integrity.
As a counter to this argument against corporal punishment, someone
might try to exploit the distinction, irresponsibly drawn by Sachs J in
Christian Education (supra), between physical punishment administered by
parents in ‘the intimate and spontaneous atmosphere of the home’ and that
carried out by teachers is ‘the detached and institutional environment of the
school’ (ibid para 48). But this distinction, with its implication that parents
are more likely than teachers to be concerned for their children’s interests and
to love them, cannot protect corporal punishment administered by parents
from the imputation that it risks psychologically harming children. For one
thing, not all parents, sadly, are concerned for their children’s wellbeing. For
another, even genuine love and affection felt by parents for their children is
consistent with the former having a ‘false conception’ of the interests and
needs of the latter. ‘Many a child’s path to hell has been paved with the best
parental intentions’ (David Archard Children: Rights and Childhood (2015)
103). Thirdly, many studies do not support the hypothesis that negative
outcomes associated with corporal punishment, including increased risk of
delinquency and aggression, will be moderated by parental ‘intimacy’ and
love.
The court also makes no mention of available evidence concerning the
likelihood of mild corporal punishment escalating into exercises of force that
are manifestly unacceptably severe (see for example David G Gil Violence
Against Children: Physical Abuse in the United States (1973); James Garbarino
‘The human ecology of child maltreatment:Aconceptual model for research’
(1977) 39 Journal of Marriage and the Family 721; Ross Vasta ‘Physical child
abuse: A dual-component analysis’ (1982) 2 Developmental Review 125; John E
B Myers Child Protection in America: Past, Present and Future (2006) 146–7).
One explanation of the potential for ‘reasonable’ corporal punishment to
escalate into an exercise of more severe force, even when administered by
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parents who are mindful of the restriction on the severity of lawful corporal
punishment imposed by the defence, is that, as Keightley J observed, parents
who wish to avail themselves of the opportunity to inflict corporal punish-
ment that the defence affords will have to decide on the severity of physical
force that is ‘reasonable’ in the circumstances, and they may, because the
limits implied by the signifier ‘reasonable’ are vague, inadvertently cross the
line separating lawful corporal punishment from more severe forms that even
corporal punishment’s defenders concede may be physically injurious or
psychologically damaging (para 68).
The court neglected in addition to mention a related point counting
strongly in favour of the criminalisation of parental corporal punishment: that
the limited determinacy of the defence, in addition to exposing children to
the risk of excessive corporal punishment, exposes parents who are concerned
to limit their use of corporal punishment to what is reasonable (and so lawful)
to the risk of criminal prosecution and punishment, since they will have to
interpret for themselves what level of physical force is reasonable in the
circumstances. Parents’ judgement concerning how much force is reasonable
will perforce be (to some extent) subjective and so will be influenced by their
moral, religious and cultural beliefs. And when their view of what qualifies as
‘reasonable’ corporal punishment conflicts with the views of legal officials,
they run the risk of being criminally prosecuted and convicted — as the
appellant was in this case. It is plausible to think that parents should not be
exposed to the risk of prosecution and conviction as the cost of availing
themselves of the liberty accorded to them by the defence to administer
corporal punishment.
Keightley J drew support for her decision from a concern previously
expressed by the Constitutional Court regarding the extravagantly violent
nature of South African society and the state’s duty to combat violence: the
reference in Williams ((supra) para 51) to the unacceptable levels of violence
in South Africa and Sachs J’s insistence in Christian Education ((supra para 43)
that the state is under a duty to reduce ‘the amount of public and private
violence in society generally’. But while she is right that the occurrence of
corporal punishment contributes to the overall level of violence by itself being
a type of violence, she fails to register that it does so too by engendering
violence through the example it sets for children, who are always liable to
extract from it the lesson that it is permissible for those in a position of power
to use physical violence to express their disapproval of perceived misconduct
and to resolve disputes. Many studies have found that the use of corporal
punishment is associated with increased aggression in children, who are more
likely to approve of violent punishments (see for instance Zvi Strassberg,
Kenneth A Dodge, Gregory S Pettit & John E Bates ‘Spanking in the home
and children’s subsequent aggression towards kindergarten peers’ (1994) 6
Development and Psychopathology 445; Catherine A Taylor, Jennifer A Manga-
nello, Shawna J Lee & Janet C Rice ‘Mother’s spanking of 3-year-old
children and subsequent risk of children’s aggressive behaviour’ (2010) 125
Pediatrics 1057–65; Dominique A Simons & Sandy K Wurtele ‘Relationships
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between parents’ use of corporal punishment and their children’s endorse-
ment of spanking and hitting other children’ (2010) 24 Child Abuse and
Neglect 639; Shawna J Lee, Inna Altschul & Elizabeth T Gershoff ‘Does
warmth moderate longitudinal associations between maternal spanking and
child aggression in early childhood?’ (2013) 49 Developmental Psychology
2017).
Objections to criminalisation and the limitations analysis
The court rebutted two objections to criminalisation of all corporal punish-
ment carried out by parents. The first is that it will result in the criminal
conviction for assault, and punishment of, a greater number of benevolently
motivated parents who could ‘end up losing their children’ (para 80). This
objection is for three reasons unsound. First, in countries in which corporal
punishment by parents has been criminalised, and in which a policy of
prosecutorial restraint resembling the one that the Minister proposes to
follow is operative (New Zealand, for example) few care-givers have faced
criminal prosecution for administering mild corporal punishment. The
policy has been to rely more on the attitude-altering effects of legal
prohibition and on the pedagogical effects of educational campaigns that
have accompanied it. (This has the added advantage of obviating any
appreciable extra strain being placed on the criminal justice system.)
Secondly, even if some parents are criminally convicted and punished, it
need not be the case that legal officials would be authorised to remove their
children from the family home where this would not serve the best interests
of the children concerned. Parents could be subjected to punishments that do
not rupture the integrity of the family unit, including mandatory attendance
at specialised programmes focused on violence against women and children,
which would not only be sufficiently burdensome as to constitute hard
treatment, but would also confront them with the nature and effects of
corporal punishment, with the aim of persuading them to recognise that it
violates children’s rights and poses a risk of psychological harm to them, and
that it ought to be eschewed. Thirdly, outlawing corporal punishment may
well result in fewer criminal prosecutions of parents overall. On the assump-
tion that fewer parents are likely to inflict corporal punishment in the
aftermath of the ban on all corporal punishment, and given the potential for
moderate corporal punishment to escalate into force that amounts to assault,
fewer prosecutions of parents for assault are likely to take place.
The second objection is that the criminalisation of all corporal punishment
would encroach on the right to freedom of religion of parents who perceive
themselves to be under a religious obligation to administer it, or who, while
not actually considering it to be enjoined by their religion, view it as giving
expression to their religious outlook on child-rearing. The court rejected this
objection, and for the right reason: any restrictions placed by the criminalisa-
tion of all corporal punishment on the religious freedom of parents ‘are not
such as to warrant retaining a defence that fundamentally undermines the
rights of children’ (para 84). The purpose of criminalisation is to protect
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children’s rights and to safeguard their important interest in not being
subjected to the risk of psychological harm. In the face of this concern,
religious and cultural prerogatives must give way. Unfortunately, the court
went on to say that had FORSA’s religious freedom claim been framed
instead as a claim for a religious exemption, ‘this might have provided a
stronger basis to argue against the wholesale doing away with the defence’
(para 83). What Keightley J presumably means by this is that it is easier to
argue for a religious exemption, which would permit only religious parents
to administer corporal punishment, than to argue for the retention of the
defence, which would allow all parents to administer it. It is easier because
fewer children would receive corporal punishment under the religious
accommodation, resulting in the rights of fewer children being violated and
fewer children being exposed to the risk of psychological harm, than if the
defence was to be retained. There is, however, a different and more
important sense in which the claim of religious parents to be excused from
compliance with the criminal prohibition on corporal punishment has no
more force than the claim that the defence should be retained on the ground
that eliminating it would violate some parents’ right to religious liberty. Once
it is established that some practice would violate the fundamental rights of
children and imperil their basic interests, there is no room for an exemption
to permit certain parents to engage in it in accordance with their religious
convictions:
‘The purpose of a law against corporal punishment is not simply to reduce its
incidence, although that is part of it. The deeper and broader purpose is to offer
children protection against the risk of psychological harm and the violation of
their basic rights — for that is what each incident of corporal punishment
amounts to. It is, at bottom, concern for the interests and rights of children that
underpins — and justifies — the ‘‘ultimatum’’ addressed to parents and teachers
to refrain on pain of legal sanction from administering corporal punishment. In
the face of that concern, their perceived religious and cultural prerogatives must
needs give way. As Richard Arneson and Ian Shapiro put it, ‘[i]f the parents’ free
exercise rights genuinely do clash with the children’s rights ... then parents must
either internalize their own religious freedom or, in the limiting case, decline to
be parents.’ (Lenta op cit at 175.)
In Christian Education, Sachs J declined to grant a religious exemption to
permit religious teachers to administer corporal punishment for this sort of
reason (Christian Education (supra) para 50). Admittedly, the denial of an
accommodation from a blanket criminal prohibition of corporal punishment
to permit religious parents to administer it has a greater impact on them than
the refusal of an exemption in favour of teachers. As Sachs J pointed out,
denying religious teachers an exemption to allow them to administer
corporal punishment does not prevent religious parents from ensuring that
their children receive physical correction in response to the latter’s transgres-
sions: ‘The parents are not being obliged to make an absolute and strenuous
choice between obeying a law of the land or following their conscience.
They can do both simultaneously’ (Christian Education ibid para 51). That is, it
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would still be open to parents to administer corporal punishment for
disciplinary infractions occurring at school. By contrast, the denial of an
exemption from the legal prohibition of corporal punishment by parents
confronts them with a stark choice between adherence to the criminal law
and adherence to the prescripts of their religion (as some parents interpret
them). Sometimes the impact on religious believers of forcing them to
choose between the tenets of their faith and the requirements of the law
provides sufficient justification for an accommodation. This may be the case
where the practice that religious petitioners wish to engage in does not
violate the fundamental rights of others. Prince v President of the Law Society of
the Cape of Good Hope 2002 (2) SA 794 (CC), which involved a claim for a
religious exemption in favour of Rastafarians from a criminal prohibition on
cannabis possession, was, I think, a case in which an accommodation was
justified on exactly these grounds, Rastafarian cannabis possession and use
violating no-one’s fundamental rights (Prince (supra) para 149; for apprecia-
tive discussions of Sachs J’s minority judgment in Prince, see Patrick Lenta
‘Religious liberty and cultural accommodation’ (2005) 122 SALJ 352 at
371–5; Patrick Lenta ‘Religious and cultural accommodations to school
uniform regulations’ (2008) 1 Constitutional Court Review 259 at 266–71). But
the claim for an accommodation to permit religious parents to hit their
children is not such a case and the uniform, exceptionless enforcement of the
prohibition must be robustly insisted upon.
CONCLUSION
There is much to admire in the court’s judgment, not least the courage of
two judges’ criminalising a practice viewed by the majority of SouthAfricans,
albeit mistakenly, as morally permissible, and by some as morally obligatory.
Furthermore, the court provided good reasons for its decision. There is also
the occasional pungent formulation, as when Keightley J says that the effect
of the defence ‘is to render more vulnerable a group of rights-holders that has
been singled out by the Constitution to be deserving of special protection,
and whose interests are expressed to be of paramount importance’ (para 76).
But given the significance of the justificatory shortfall to which I have drawn
attention, symptomatic of well-founded legitimacy-related anxiety com-
bined, I imagine, with a burdensome caseload and limited resources with
which to conduct research, I find myself hoping that the decision will be
appealed. The probability of its being overturned (an eventuality that would,
I believe, be very bad for children) is sufficiently low in my estimation for it
to be outweighed by the desirability of affording the judiciary an opportunity
to provide a fuller, more convincing justification for criminalising parental
corporal punishment.
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